"I WILL NOT LET THEE GO, EXCEPT THOU BLESS ME!" (Genesis 32) 26)

Some considerations about the constitution of authority, inheritance, and succession

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"Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern, 
erwirb es, um es zu besitzen!"

"If you are to own what you inherited from your forefathers, 
you must first gain it!"

Goethe (Faust)

As I have been involved in various ways in this kind of work since I was a member at a Leicester Conference in 1972, my own personal and professional development was and still is related to issues of authority, inheritance and succession. Although there was no doubt for me at the very moment when I was asked to contribute to this symposium that these were the issues I wanted to reflect upon, it was also quite clear to me that a mere autobiographic account of my individual history, the various roles and the long and often not so easy way I had to take in order to let this kind of work become my own obviously was not in accordance with the task this venture is supposed to be committed to.

What I came up with instead is the attempt to use my own subjective concern and experience with the constitutional processes of authority, inheritance and succession as a guideline to explore these phenomena and the psycho-social dynamics they are based upon from a broader perspective. It appears to me that this may serve to impart my conviction better in that every attempt to find one’s own voice and to take over authority cannot exclusively be regarded as a subjective stance or decision. Although this doubtlessly is an unrenouncable precondition it nevertheless seems to me that such an act of self-authorization is not only intertwined with the psycho-social dynamics of the respective institutional context and its history; at the same time it is extensively entangled with transferences of succession, i.e. images which are as old as mankind and which as such are mainly part of the individual psychic as well as the social unconscious.

An episode in a large group

To what extent such an assumption proves itself to be valid became only recently obvious to me in one of our last Working Conferences in Germany. During the final large group session when the members were increasingly concerned about earning the fruits of the work they had done in the course of the conference the notion of blessing arose. The question was raised who would be the ones who would profit most from the common experience and the possible learning derived therefrom. Then, suddenly one of the women,
a protestant minister, found her voice and began to tell the legend of Jacob's wrestle with the man at the river Jabbok from the book of Genesis in the Old Testament. It was she who quoted the central phrase which Jacob had said to his opponent when after a whole night's fight daybreak came: "I will not let thee go, except thou bless me!" (Genesis 32, 26). Two other male members, a consultant and a chief-psychiatrist, independently of each other added further aspects both to this particular episode of Jacob's wrestle with the man as well as to further parts of the Jacob legends. Thus the metaphoric frame of Jacob was set as someone who, in addition to his obstinate longing for the blessing, also had obtained the birthright of Esau, his twin-brother for some lentil broth; with his mother's help he had ultimately succeeded in deceiving his father Isaac into giving him the paternal blessing. As a result of his wrestle at the Jabbok Jacob was limping because of his hip.

It was quite impressive to realize how the more mature members made use of his extended frame in order to disentangle themselves from the cobweb of experience and wrestles they had been engaged in during the previous course of the conference. While some members began to look at the guilt feelings which resulted from the unavoidable consequence of their active attempts to take over their particular roles and to find their own authority and how they had hurt and betrayed others, other members were able to admit that they were going to leave the conference having been hurt themselves during the wrestle in the darkness. Thus the notion of a blessing could be seen from quite a different perspective than just forcing the consultants to name those who were supposed to get the birthright or the blessing. Members increasingly became aware that such a blessing was neither a matter of instant grace, nor could it be longed for without the experience of ongoing pain. It became sufficiently clear that the only approval which one could receive for one's learning in this conference was through one's own authority.

I am quite convinced that the nerves of one or the other member were struck and that, therefore, they may find ways to take possession of what they have learned from their experience. Metaphorically speaking, I would not be too surprised if on the occasion of one of our next conferences or in other working contexts I would meet some of these people again, still limping because of their hip.

Looking back at the more than 30 years of history of which this kind of work comprises since the first Working Conference was set up in Leicester in September 1957 (cf. Trist and Sofer (1959); Rice (1965)), it appears to me that every attempt to explore this history a bit further in order to learn from it inescapably leads one into various metaphors, legends,
myths, and fictions. There can be no doubt that in addition to the exploration of the unconscious which this kind of work furthers in a predominant way we have also created and produced new kinds of societal and social unconsciousness (cf. Erdheim (1984)) to such an extent that it has often become difficult to discriminate between its production and maintenance. The fact that we who are gathered here on the occasion of this symposium have committed ourselves to this kind of work in various ways can thus, for example, not be separated from our own imaginations and fantasies which we hold on to about notions such as inheritance, legacy, and succession. We hold on tight to these images in order to define our own stance as well as to locate ourselves in relation to those who share a longer - or a shorter - part of that history and the inheritance. And among the various experiences from which these imaginations are derived are, on occasion, also rivalries among the siblings similar to those between Jacob and his twin-brother Esau, or among Joseph and his brothers or between Leah and Rachel about Jacob's favor.

As there seems to exist no legal inheritance grid (cf. Thompson (1976)) for this kind of work the opinions and fantasies vary as to who regards him- or herself as the legitimate heir, reversionary heir, heir apparent or whom legitimately can be regarded as such. Although there is quite some agreement that what we are committed to is fundamentally based upon the work of Melanie Klein, Wilfried Bion, Donald W. Winnicott, A. Kenneth Rice and various others’ there seem to be more myths than evidence on the question as to who among the successors received a blessing on which occasion.

**The Jacob legend**

In this presentation I have attempted to contribute towards a better understanding of the psycho-social dynamics of what metaphorically can be regarded as a blessing, however, it is not motivated by the intention to write a genealogy. What I am trying to offer is a further reaching insight into the dynamic itself in order to extend our capacity for exploration and, hopefully, understanding, too.

After that particular large group experience, the more I went through the patriarchal stories of the Old Testament as well as through various exegetics, both biblical and psycho-analytical, the more it became clear to me that they include a metaphorical frame for the dynamic in which we are involved.
According to my own reading of Genesis Jacob appears to me to be the biblical figure who is obviously most preoccupied by an obstinate longing for a blessing. In comparison to the various other situations in which Jacob either received the paternal blessing from his father Isaac or gave it to his son Joseph and ultimately to his grandsons the blessing during this particular night at the Jabbok carries a special significance; nowhere else in the Old Testament could a blessing be perceived through a wrestle (Westermann (1981), 531 ff., 631). It seems that for Jacob the paternal blessing was the passing over of the vigor and that the confirmation of God's covenant with Abraham just was not sufficient. What he was aspiring to in addition was a reconfirmation of the confirmation of his choosenness; a reflexive confirmation, so to speak: the paternal blessing had to be enforced through the divine one (cf. Westman (1986), 157).

At the same time this wrestle at the Jabbok and the corresponding blessing is a prominent example of how individual and collective longings for succession coincide. Jacob's immediate dynamic during this night was determined by the enormous anxieties resulting from the fact that on his way home into his father's land he was supposed to meet his brother Esau the following day - an anxiety which literally made Jacob face his own and his family's death. This episode in the later Judaic tradition became the symbolization of the Israelites as God's chosen people. Thus Jacob's opponent who was originally described either as an angel or a demon had to be converted into God. What originally had to be seen as a symbolization of a struggle for life and against death, both for Jacob and his extended family, was later converted into a political legitimation of Israel as a people. As Jacob's name was changed into Israel he was made into a protagonist of endless lines of succession.

If on the other hand, however, one holds on to the original notion of the blessing Jacob received in the wrestle, this particular episode opens up some quite fascinating insights and fantasies: the wrestle at the river and the related blessing appear as metaphors for maturation and authorization.

As various psychoanalytical authors have indicated (Arlow (1951), Niederland (1954), Rank (1974), Reik (1919), Zeligs (1953)), this episode is a mythical story that the hero is giving up his lifelong contest with the father and the combat with the twin-brother. Thus the fact that the opponent hurt Jacob's hip can be regarded as a euphemistic expression for the acceptance of his symbolic castration (Reik (1919), 332 f.; Niederland (1972), 137; Sas (1964), 118 f.). "Jacob was wrestling with his own projected visions of himself" which
were derived from "the angry father of the childhood Oedipal conflict who had come to punish him" (Zeligs (1953), 195 f.). As such this blessing can be seen as a transference of the strength of the father which was transferred to Jacob by either an angel or a demon (cf. Westermann (1981)).

According to some Talmudic and rabbinical sources the stranger in the wrestle is representing the phallus which Jacob had originally adopted from his father. This as well as the fact that the wrestle itself is occasionally seen as a dream (cf. Zeligs (1953), 194) or a nightmare provokes the conviction that this particular Jacob legend is an expression of reparation and self-authorization. As such the limping can be understood as a symbolization of the lasting pain by which the acceptance of one's own authority is often accompanied.

Akin to the Gilgamesh-epos the Jacob legend as a whole is proof that the taking over of succession and inheritance is intertwined with the experience of the tragic: not only that Jacob had to face his own death at the Jabbok during possibly the most critical combat of his life; time and again he had to make the despairing experience that the future which was supposed to be created for him through the blessing (Reik (1919), 329; cf. Westman (1986), 145) did not come true and seemed to have even been destroyed. Beside the fact that Laban, his father-in-law, had betrayed him for Rachel, his beloved wife, he had to suffer twice through endless years of hopelessness: a long period of barrenness during which it was denied to Rachel to give birth to a legitimate heir and the apparent death of his successor when Joseph was sold to Egypt by his brothers. Whereas during the period of his wife's barrenness Jacob was preoccupied by the desperate doubt about his and his family's future, towards the end of his life he even had to face the conviction that God had ultimately betrayed him (cf. Mann (1971), 471 ff.).

Although there can be no doubt that Jacob has the predominant role in this ancient tragedy of succession and inheritance it becomes further evident that the Jacob legend is the story of a social drama. Nearly everyone of the extended family is either caught into it or affected by it; despite the desperate longing to assure their place in the order of relatedness and succession the family members, men and women alike, on various occasions are confronted by embarrassing rearrangements. Even on his deathbed Jacob disturbs the natural line of succession through a trick: when Joseph had placed Mennasseh to his grandfather's right in order that he received the main blessing, Jacob just crossed his hands and chose Ephraim, the second born grand-son, as his successor.
What is also obvious in this particular drama of succession is the fact that the notion of inheritance in the Jacob legend is by no means preoccupied by a passing over of a material inheritance, be it goods, animals or slaves. This inheritance is primarily regarded as a matter of spirituality and transcendence. The assurance of one's own line and place in the succession exceeds the narrow space of one's life and allows oneself to excel beyond the frame which is given to one by birth and death (cf. Lawrence (1985)). Since the notion of immortality did not exist in these ancient times the attempt to locate oneself in the lines of inheritance and succession was the only way to overcome one's inevitable death and to link oneself to eternity. In so far as the notion of the individual was also non-existent during this phase of mankind, it is needless to say that such a transcendence was only imaginable as a collective enterprise.

Although it appears that the Jacob legend, in particular, and the patriarchal narratives, in general, are preoccupied with a high concern to give birth to the right son, such a son is at the same time the symbolization of a much broader concern (cf. Gordon (1954)). Thus Jacob, the hero, may also be regarded as a mythical protagonist of man's desire not to be alone; to be greater than one actually is; to differentiate oneself from the surrounding pagans; to find a meaning to history; to establish and to legitimate a relatedness through a continuum of men and gods; and to convince oneself that despite one’s inescapable death one does not have to die.

The transferences of succession

When I subsequently tried to grasp the early origin and further development of psychoanalysis which is inseparably connected with Sigmund Freud as its declared founder I was surprised time and again at its similarities and parallels to the early Judaic history. To make a long story of discoveries short, what surprised me most was (1) the intense identification Freud had with Jacob, (2) the significance which succession and legacy had and obviously still have in the psychoanalytic movement and (3) to what extent the paternal family and the patriarchal tribe have nearly exclusively been the frame of imagination for the conscious as well as unconscious dynamics of social reality.

(1) I was obviously guided by my own preference for images when the first Freud biography I happened to read, the one edited by Ernest Freud, his wife and Ilse Grubrich-Simitis (E. Freud, Freud, and Grubrich-Simitis (1977)), gave me quite an intensive image of Freud,
his relatives and disciples. What struck me most, was the fact that Eissler's (1977) biographical sketch, with which this book is introduced, ends with just the phrase from Genesis I had chosen as the title for my presentation: "I will not let thee go, except thou bless me!"

I only later discovered that this was not exclusively a metaphorical reference to Freud's titanic wrestle but had quite a broad significance in regard to the role which Jacob, the patriarch, played in Sigmund Freud's life. Not only that he was surrounded by various namesakes - his father, his father-in-law as well as the father of Wilhelm Fliess carried the name of Jacob; on various occasions Freud compared and identified himself with this hero of the Old Testament. As Max Schur ((1973), 115, 250 ff., 268), Freud's physician during the last eleven years before his death, has indicated, this identification with Jacob had begun as early as 1895 during the deep friendship with Wilhelm Fliess; in a letter to him in 1900, shortly before the end of their friendship, Freud explicitly refers to Jacob's wrestle with the angel (Freud (1986), 453); and immediately before he left Vienna for London in 1938 Freud compares himself, in a letter to his son Ernest, with the ancient Jacob who shortly before the end of his life was taken to Egypt by his sons (Jones (1962b), 267).

What surprised me in addition to this rather obvious identification of Freud with Jacob was a rather hidden analogy of how these two men struggled with life. In my obviously biased attempt to understand the psycho-social dynamics of the early times of psychoanalysis better it often occurred to me that Freud not only seems to have experienced a similar tragedy to Jacob's but somehow 'repeated' quite similar patterns of succession.

The most obvious analogy seems to be that Freud regarded himself and was regarded by his successors as the founder of a new scientific discipline and thus was supposed to assume a similar role to that which Jacob had, through whom God had founded the Israelites as a people. But if one takes the Jacob legend as a metaphorical frame for Freud's life and much of the development of psychoanalysis further 'analogies' may be found. Like Jacob Freud was not only the beloved and favored son of his mother (cf. Genesis 25, 27), he was also born into an extended family in which his place in the line of succession was not in accordance with his actual age (cf. Bernfeld, Cassirer Bernfeld (1944), 109 f.). As Jones ((1960), 19) states, Freud was actually born (in 1856) as an uncle with two half-brothers (Emanuel, born 1832 and Philipp, born 1836), a fact which later seems, for example, to have influenced his relationship to Breuer who - fourteen years older than Freud - occasionally was either a father or a brother to him and thus became
both the object of his love, admiration, and trust as well as that of distrust, rebellion, and hostility (cf. Bernfeld (1949), 149; Clark (1985), 58; Roazen (1971), 99 ff., (1976), 244). In so far as the brother is often enough represented mythologically by the twin-brother (cf. Rank (1909)) one is reminded of Jacob's buying the birthright from Esau if one realizes that Freud regarded the loss of the friendship to Breuer as the price he was supposed to pay for the further development of psychoanalysis (Freud (1955), 43 ff.). Also the deep friendship with Wilhelm Fliess during Freud's time of 'splendid isolation' may appear in another light if it is seen from the twin dynamic. As such the friendship with Fliess and its end caused by a struggle over priority as well as by Freud's inability to cope with the latent homosexuality inherent in their relationship (Schur (1973), 261 ff.) represents quite well Freud's predominant pattern of relating to men, both friends and disciples. Freud's obstinate longing for deeper and intimate relationships with men nearly always failed; the fact that he never reconciled himself with any of them (cf. Sachs (1950), 112) seems not only to indicate a severe tendency towards a splitting on Freud's side; there seems to be quite some evidence that irreconcilable splitting has become a dominant social pattern during the subsequent history of psychoanalysis (cf. Grotjahn (1984), 355; Cremerius (1982); Sievers (1986), (1987b)). The final judgement which e.g. Jones ((1960), 337) made about Fliess - a man who mentally was quite below the master - not only reminds me of the splitting in the Genesis (25, 27) where Esau is the wild hairy man, skilful in hunting, a man of the open plains whereas "Jacob led a settled life and stayed among the tents"; it refers also to a similar pattern by which later e.g. Adler, Stekel, Jung and Rank left the inner circle which somehow extinguished their names from the book of life. This early psycho-social dynamic not only contributed to further institutional splitting among the Freudians, Jungians, Adlerians and various other analytically oriented groups; it may at the same time be a commonly unconscious reason that friendship in the psychoanalytic movement, in general, is quite rare (van der Leeuw (1968), 113).

In the frame of the Jacob legend the lifelong struggle between two other descendents of Freud may appear from another perspective, i.e. that between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein, which for decades caused the possible definite split of the British Psycho-Analytic Society (cf. Peters (1979); Grosskurth (1986)). If their ongoing contest is - on a metaphorical mythological level - compared with the one among Jacob's two wives, the twin-sisters Leah and Rachel, one may get a more precise image of what possibly were the not so apparent dynamics in the extended quarrel between and about these two prominent psychoanalysts. As with their ancient predecessors the rivalry among Anna Freud and Melanie Klein can only at the very least be interpreted as a personal issue; a
more profound exploration of this quarrel may contribute to a whole variety of further dimensions: e.g. the quite difficult integration of maternal and paternal lines of analytic thinking these women were representing; the hypothesis that this quarrel among the daughters may also have served to hide the one among the sons who, in the British context, in addition to various others, were represented by Ernest Jones and Edward Glover; or even the longtime publicly unknown fact that both women were involved in 'incestuous' relationships - Anna Freud through the fact that she was analyzed by her father (cf. Grosskurth (1986), 99, 179, 322; Roazen (1976), 423 ff.) and Melanie Klein through the analysis of her own children (Klein (1920), (1921)).

From a more general level one may probably agree with Turkle ((1978), 137) that the fact that psychoanalysis has been passed down directly from analyst to analysand has made "every analyst alive today (into) Freud's descendent". But the more one tries to get deeper into the history of psychoanalysis one has to realize that these analysts are related and interrelated with each other in various, according to contemporary standards of abstinence often quite obscure ways. It is beyond my knowledge whether there already exists a genealogical tree of who was analyzed by whom in the first decades of psychoanalysis. The fact that, for example, Melanie Klein and Ernest Jones were both analyzed by S. Ferenczi, Jones' wife and children were in analysis with M. Klein, E. Glover was the analyst of Melitta Klein, Melanie Klein's daughter whom she had previously analyzed is only a short indication of how the transferences among the founder, the immediate disciples and further descendents must have been interrelated, intertwined and often hopelessly mixed up with each other (cf. Cremerius (1986), 1076).

Although there can be no doubt that to commit oneself to psychoanalysis necessarily means to come to terms with Freud as the founder (Erdheim (1984), X f.) such an attempt may catch one not only in one's own transferences but in a cobweb of the transferences of countless others as well as reflexive ones, i.e. transferences about transferences. With whose help one ever tries to come to terms with Freud and his early disciples, one has although to be aware that in addition to one's own individual unconscious one continuously has to face the temptation of getting caught by the unconscious which is produced ever since collectively; and quite an important part of it are the transferences referring to inheritance and succession.

(2) What further surprised me in my attempt to understand the origin and early history of psychoanalysis was the repeated explicit reference to legacy and succession in relation to
Freud's work. There can be no doubt that Freud regarded himself as a central link in an eternal chain of succession: he saw himself both as a descendent in the Israeliitic tradition with an explicit identification with Jacob and Moses (cf. Freud (1975); Robert (1975)) as well as a founder of an empire, a school of thought which was named after him and which was destined to cause his own immortality. The dedication in Ernest Jones' (1960) Freud biography mirrors these aspirations quite well: Anna Freud is referred to as the 'true daughter of an Immortal Sire'. On another occasion, in his collection of centenary addresses, Jones ((1956), 150) describes Freud's work "as a gift to mankind, whose recognition of its value can only increase with the passage of time". Whereas Fromm (1959) emphasizes 'Sigmund Freud's Mission', Sachs ((1950), 128) is concerned about how to become an "heir of Freud's wisdom".

The fact that the notion of legacy and inheritance have become a significant one in the psychoanalytic tradition is further mirrored by the evaluation of the works of various of Freud's early disciples and successors: Esther Menaker's (1982) biography of Otto Rank, for example, is entitled 'A rediscovered legacy'; Max Horkheimer (1978) in his obituary on Ernst Simmel, the early successor who after having left Berlin in 1933 died in Los Angeles shortly after the Second World War, refers to Simmel's legacy of his philosophical emphasis of psychoanalysis; and Grosskurth ((1986), 462) finishes her biography of Melanie Klein by indicating the "legacy of rich provocative, and enduring ideas" this woman has devised to future generations.

The emphasis which is put on notions of inheritance, legacy and immortality since the early times of psychoanalysis appears particularly astonishing if one realizes that Freud himself and obviously the vast majority of his descendents regarded themselves as agnostics. Besides the fact that such a preoccupation with immortality may be understood as one of various other aspects which contributed to converting the psychoanalytic movement into a functional equivalent for the church (cf. Clark (1985), 354), it also may be regarded as a proof that the immortality ideology of the artist which Otto Rank had described in his early work on 'Art and Artist'(Rank (1932)) had become a predominant one for Freud and the majority of his descendents. It seems as if the immortality of one's work was regarded as the only possibility of overcoming the somehow materialistic notion of the soul on which particularly Freud's early work was based (cf. Rank (1950); Horkheimer (1978), 486). "To die without a legacy is to disappear as an individual. It would be as if one's life had never been lived" (O'Dowd (1979), 63).
There is quite some evidence that through the further development of psychoanalysis the acceptance of this inheritance and the identification with the testator and his work has become the critical precondition to be regarded as a psychoanalyst. And during the further development and institutionalization of this discipline it often enough appeared as if the only way one as a successor and descendent could gain immortality for oneself was through a collective immortality strategy, i.e. through identification with the 'Immortal Sire'; instead of attempting to reach one's own immortality through one's own creative work exploring the unconscious one only could take part in the immortality of the founder and the movement he had initiated (cf. Giegerich (1987)). It seems as if this orthodoxy also mirrors its Israelitic inheritance: the observance of the law was the precondition for the people of Israel to stay for ever in the inherited land (cf. Dt 4, 40; 5, 16; Jr. 35, 15).

The institutionalization of the training analysis as the formalized precondition of further professionalization thus since its early days has become an equivalent for the novitiate of the church (cf. Sachs (1930), 53; Cremerius (1987); Pollmann (1985)). - Also Melanie Klein's famous remark "My dear, don't make any mistake. I'm a Freudian, but not an Anna Freudian" (Grosskurth (1986), 456) can be understood as an enforced confession towards a church-like belief system. Lacan is another prominent proof that self-authorization in the psychoanalytic movement is inclined with excommunication (cf. Turkle (1978)).

What this early preoccupation with inheritance and legacy in addition to its Israelitic and ecclesiastical connotations mirrors is the type of the classical entrepreneur of the years of rapid expansion at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. It was part of the image of the entrepreneur of these times "that he tried to impose his personal will, his view, perspectives, reasons and even is own moral on to his enterprise in order to reach an unité de doctrine among almost all of his employees" (Ulrich (1981), 13). The enterprise became his life-work and thus the pyramid of the founder's immortality (cf. Sievers (1987a)). It seems that in the early process of institutionalization of psychoanalysis this image of the classical entrepreneur as well as that of the highly regarded German professor of these times who was supposed to be a founder of a school of his own thought coincided with the above stated religious inheritance.

Freud's early circle in Vienna, the Wednesday Evening Society, as well as the International Psychoanalytic Association, which, originated by Freud, was founded during the second International Congress in Nuremberg in 1910 (cf. Jones (1962a), 88 ff.) thus since their very beginning were not only preoccupied by the further dissemination of his mission but
also by the purity and legitimacy of the doctrine. During the subsequent years, particularly after the break with Jung, this unité de doctrine was more and more jeopardized and Freud ultimately in 1913, initiated by Jones, founded the 'committee' as the incarnation of the covenant (cf. Jones (1962a), 186 ff.; Wittenberger (1988)). There can be no doubt that the intention to guard the legitimacy and purity of the doctrine through the committee was inseparably intertwined with the dynamic of inheritance and succession. Thus the committee became the guarant to give the 'cause' a future and to install its eternity. Akin to the Academia Espanola which Freud once had founded as a boy with his friend Eduard Silberstein (cf. Clark (1985), 34 f.) the 'covenant of the seven rings' (Sachs (1950), 144 ff.) inevitably had to be secret.

Possibly in addition to various others the committee was explicitly guided by two main transferences of succession: by the ancient covenant God had made with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as well as by the parable of the three rings. This parable which reaches back to the 11th century (cf. Schmidt (1909), 327 ff.) contains the explanation of the founding of Judaism, Christianism, and Islam by an old father who on his deathbed gave replicas of an old ring he had inherited to his three sons; the original ring, however, was lost and never found again. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, the German philosopher and poet of the 18th century had based his drama 'Nathan der Weise' (Nathan, the wise man), which first appeared in 1779, on this legend - a play which Freud doubtlessly knew as he always had a high admiration for Lessing (cf. E. Freud, Freud, and Grubrich-Simitis (1977), 96). The fact that Freud gave his disciples a gem as the symbol for the covenant which they subsequently mounted into golden rings (Jones (1962a), 189) can itself be seen as a devotion to Lessing through whom "the cut stones of the Ancients from Italian collections were newly brought into perspective for German scholars" (Kluge (1975), 247; Lessing (1974), 778 - 793). It can only be speculated as to whether Freud knew that these two metaphors - the ancient covenant and the parable of the three rings - as a matter of fact, were intertwined: the parable in its 11th century version contains the explicit assertion that both Esau and Jacob had received a gem from their father Isaac.

The notion of succession in the committee becomes even more predominant if one is reminded that its founding was a direct consequence of the apparent split between Freud and Jung which, after months of mutual distrust, occurred in January 1913 (cf. McGuire, Sauerländer (1974), 598 ff.; Jung (1971), 161 ff.). After Freud had throned Jung as his crown prince and had almost made him the heir apparent who, as the 'Aryan hero' (cf. Grotjahn (1984), 354), was supposed to lead psychoanalysis out of the Jewry one can
imagine how Freud must have been preoccupied with installing his work as a legacy; some further evidence for this desire can be derived from the fact that Freud, who at that time was in his late fifties, was for many years convinced of his early death (cf. Jones (1962a), 459 f.).

It somehow appears quite disillusioning and encouraging at the same time that in spite of all these variously intertwined transferences of succession and inheritance which to quite an extent have unconsciously influenced and maintained most of what presently appears as psychoanalysis, someone like van der Leeuw ((1968), 161) in his presidential address at the 25th International Psycho-Analytical Congress, literally negates the fictitious illusion of a psychoanalytic inheritance: "We must constantly keep in mind the fact that Freud's work was a gift to mankind. Nobody owns it, no one was given the right to safeguard it or is capable of doing so, and no one has been appointed his successor or his heir." This author is not allowing any doubt that the emotional relationship each of us establishes with Freud and any of his disciples is not his or their creation, "but our own response". Therefore, there can be no doubt that whenever we try to substitute the inheritance for the gift and to promote ourselves or others as its custodian we are expressing "our infantile attitude towards life". And this may also be true when people emphasize that Freud was the only inventor of psychoanalysis; this appears as a monotheistic deification which mainly serves the purpose of making us forget that we ourselves - as Ernest Becker (1973) once stated it - are 'gods with arses'. From our contemporary perspectives it may appear much easier to overcome the split of Freud and Jung than it was for them as well as for their immediate disciples; to recognize and to admit equally that "through Freud's and Breuer's careful observations and Freud's brilliant thinking, it became possible to postulate the unconscious" (Sullivan (1950), 320) seems unto this day an exception.

(3) One explanation why the psychoanalytic movement from its early times till now has been and still is so preoccupied with these basic and intertwined transferences of succession seems to be the fact of how 'primatively' the early attempts toward institutionalization were conceptualized and imagined. The patterns of institutionalization and their respective metaphoric frame, were practically limited to that of the paternal 'bourgeois' family for which Freud's own paternal family, both his parental one as well as the one he founded with Martha Bernays, were predominant examples (cf. Schülein (1975), 69 - 74); another institutional map of the mind obviously was the patriarchal tribe as it mirrors the Jewish inheritance of Freud and the majority of his early disciples - a notion which was
subsequently extended through the phylogenetic perspective which Freud developed in 'Totem and Taboo' which was first published in 1913.

Ferenczi's (1970) contribution at the Nuremberg Congress in 1910 through which he encouraged the founding of an International Association very well mirrors the inevitable dilemma of the family model. He was convinced that associations, in general, basically reproduce the dynamics of a family. But despite his own insight that the early disciples of Freud were condensing the father with the spiritual leader into a vision (Ferenczi (1970), 52 ff.) he postulated the nearly impossible. There was no doubt for him that the psychoanalytically trained members were particularly called upon to found an association in which the highest amount of personal freedom could be connected with the advantages of a family organization. He believed in a family in which the father would not rely on dogmatic but on functional authority (cf. Hartmann (1964)) which was supposed to be based on his competence and accomplishments. Unlike the pater familias such a father would be prepared to be concerned about the criticism of his children.

There is quite some evidence in the further development of this association that this probably failed altogether. Among all the subsequent paternal contests with Freud, C. G. Jung and Otto Rank have become the most prominent examples that the family-like association was time and again overloaded with the primitive regressive dynamics which such a metaphor inescapably invokes. Freud's misuse of authority had become the ultimate reason for Jung to refuse the inheritance and to break with the father (cf. Jung (1971)). And also more than ten years later Rank saw no other choice for himself than to give up the role of the favorite son in order to save himself as a person. Both these men had, as Grotjahn ((1984), 356; cf. Grotjahn (1973/74)) states, to leave the father "in despair, feeling threatened in their rights to their own lives". It seems that they had to leave like the demon in the wrestle at the Jabbok when daybreak came.

At the same time the contest with the father was always paralleled by the quarrel among the sons. Despite Jones'((1962a), 200) occasional remark that the members of the committee were "a happy union of brothers" the relationships among them often were dominated by discord, brotherly rivalries and competition for their father's love and affection. The fact that Jones ((1962a), 189) presents quite an elaborated line of how Freud had divided his affection among his disciples and sons can probably only be understood as Jones' self-justification as the only survivor.
It appears as if Freud towards the end of his life, when nearly all of his early male disciples had either left or died, initiated a second version of the 'family drama' of psychoanalysis. As he ultimately became aware that he was deprived of a son as the heir apparent he turned, "from the rebellious, quarreling brothers and sons ... to the group of loyal, loving, nursing and already waiting daughters" (Grotjahn (1984), 358; cf. Roazen (1976), 406 ff.) among whom Anna obviously played a predominant role.

Reading through the extended literature on the origin and early development of psychoanalysis and its inherent tragedy one occasionally gets the impression that particular authors cannot hide their apparent malicious joy about Freud and his early descendents as if they needed to prove that their predecessors were not as grandiose as they were supposed to be. This may be one way to cope with one's own needs of dependency and to substitute one's dissonances by means of transferences. Although there can be no doubt that the history of the psychoanalytic development can neither be understood without the dynamic of power, quarrels, and ongoing rivalries nor without the pertinent threat of splittings, Rickman ((1951), 227) offers in the reflections of his experience as a former president of the British Psycho-Analytical Society a provoking explanation when he states: "The dynamics of a multistructural group is as yet without its Freud." "In those early days the technical guidance from theory was quite inadequate to deal with such opposition as came from organized groups or society" (ibid., 226). This cognitive lack cannot, however, obscure the fact that generations of psychoanalysts as well as countless others have been involved continuously in the production process of the unconscious. Phyllis Grosskurth ((1986), 3) begins her biography with the phrase that "Melanie Klein was the stuff of which myths are made". This undoubtedly seems to be true for the discipline as a whole. We have no other choice than to become aware "that the psychoanalytic movement as such is a fiction" (Taft (1958), 103). - When Otto Rank once wrote this to Freud upon his ultimate break, Freud could not react in any other way than with the reproach that Rank was obviously possessed by an evil demon (cf. Clark (1985), 512; Taft (1958) 108).

The politics of relatedness and non-relatedness

Looking back on my own experience of having been involved in this kind of work as a conference member, as a member of staff as well as on other occasions I was faced with various situations the experience and explanation of which have significantly changed my own understanding of inheritance, succession and authority.
I will, for example, never forget the chaotic turbulence of rage, anger, and despair in a Leicester Conference in 1972 (cf. Sievers (1973)) which resulted from the assassination of the Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich. Whereas I had been tempted before to exculpate myself from the genocide of the Third Reich because I had been born during the Second World War and neither my father nor my immediate relatives had been members of the Nazi movement I ultimately had to admit what a schizophrenic stance it would mean to claim e.g. Goethe, Nietzsche or Max Planck as part of my German inheritance on the one hand whereas to refuse any attachment to the holocaust as a collective inheritance on the other hand. To assume that there is not such a reality as collective guilt and responsibility no longer seemed to be true for me in that sense that I henceforth could no longer dissociate myself from this part of the cultural inheritance through which I was coined.

A few years later I happened to be a member of staff in a conference in England immediately after Pierre Turquet's sudden death. How my colleagues must have felt and what such a loss must have meant for them and their work became comprehensible for me in a more profound sense only later. In my role as director in a German conference I had to announce to the conference membership that Augusto Ricciardi had died a few weeks ago and that, therefore, I had had to invite another colleague. Whereas on earlier occasions we were always able to rely on the experience, the competence and humour of this fatherly friend it now took us quite some painful effort to develop in ourselves the courage and the authority to enter into the new venture without him.

I also remember quite well how confused I was when on the occasion of an Institutional Event at a Leicester Conference some years ago I had become the object of a collective fantasy as a member of the training group and was set up as the possible successor to the conference director. To acknowledge such an experience for myself in order to learn from it was - as you may imagine - not an easy venture. It took me quite some time after the conference to disentangle my own private transferences of succession from and relate them to the obvious social dynamic which was caused by the unconscious fantasies both about the director's age as well as about the fact that he had just broken with his supposed heir apparent; there seems to be quite some evidence that this theme and the various myths around it, since have become prominent ones at every Leicester Conference.
In addition to various other experiences - either in conferences or in the founding process of MundO, the institution through which we organize our work in the German-speaking countries - I probably had to learn some of the most important lessons about inheritance and succession through the role-analysis and consultation (cf. Reed (1976), Weigand, Sievers (1985)) with various men and women. Particularly in those cases in which they either had succeeded a predecessor and founder of their employing institution or were supposed to take over their father’s enterprise we jointly entered into new dimensions of action-research in the attempt to disentangle the web of transfersences of succession which they, on occasions, had been caught in since their early childhood. In nearly all of these cases, it became quite obvious that - in addition to the individual significance and dynamic of inheritance - the heir or the heir in expectancy were protagonists in a more extended social drama; their relatives as well as certain employees of the enterprise played correspondingly different roles in it. In some of these cases it was fascinating to realize how these people were able to alter the script of succession once they were able to dissociate themselves through our mutual explorations from the thus far unconscious psycho-social dynamics and to reshape their own roles. On occasions the attempt to give up the lifelong fatherly contest very much resembled Jacob’s wrestle at the Jabbok. The most tragic experience I had to face, however, was with one of my former students. At the time I was preparing this presentation and I realized at her funeral that she had obviously not found any other way to carry the enormous burden of the heiress apparent than to commit suicide; I have been indebted to her for more than a decade, as she let me take part in her tragedy of succession and made me aware of what such an inheritance may be about.

In comparison to this woman as well as to some other heirs of an enterprise I have worked with I quite often feel relieved that my own ‘material’ inheritance from my parents did not excel a couple of photo albums of the family. If I had, for example, inherited an enterprise which I then was supposed to manage in order to pass it over to my own children, I am quite convinced that my life would have been quite different; no matter whether my father had been alive or dead for many years I probably still would have been caught up with him in a quarrel and contest. - But the lack of a material inheritance does not mean that I never had to face the question of succession.

Especially as a student but also during my further professional development time and again I found myself in a situation in which I desired, tried or failed to adopt someone as a father in order to take part in his knowledge, competence, experience, reputation etc. as a
disciple or junior; on occasions, for example in my doctoral dissertation which in the German academic system is supervised by a 'doctor father', I may have even tried to sound like the master's voice (Sievers (1974)). To relate and to identify with these 'fathers' for a shorter or longer time not only served my dependency needs it, on quite some occasions, also helped me to transcend myself in the sense that the other represented a stance which I desired to achieve and supported and encouraged me to aspire and to accomplish something which seemed to be beyond my own capacities. If, for example, I look at what I have written over the last two decades much of it appears to me now as fingerings and variations on a theme or a style of others before I ultimately got the impression that I had found my own voice and authority.

And a similar process obviously occurred from the time I first adopted and later integrated this kind of work till I finally was able to pursue it as my own. What thus on the one hand appears as a process of intellectual development and maturation, is, on the other hand, inseparably linked with an extended experience of relatedness to many other people as well as its denial and refusal; there can be no doubt that not only the identification but also the dissociation which accompanies it to a high degree have occurred and to quite an extent are still occurring unconsciously (cf. Miller (1985); Lawrence (1980), 82 ff.).

Looking back at the ten years since we began our first Working Conference in Germany we would never have been able to set up and to develop this kind of work further without having been able to rely on at least three 'factors', i.e. experience, friendship and institutional links; they were the 'prerequisites' intertwined with each other which ultimately helped us to build up the authority in order to pursue and to set up the venture of a Working Conference with its particular task. There is a high probability that without the enormous commitment of Gordon Lawrence, both as a close friend and as a colleague, I would never have had the courage to initiate a first conference in Germany which then occurred in 1979 as a joint venture of the Tavistock Institute and the University of Wuppertal. I only realized the following year, when I was put on my own feet, what it really meant to manage oneself in the role of a conference director compared to the joint directorship we had begun with; the day's struggle in the various events of the conference was regularly followed by the wrestle of the dreams and its opponents. Although I was nearly exhausted every time a conference was finished it always was - and still is - a most demanding venture to set up and to manage collectively such a temporary institution regardless of the particular role I had in it. The more we were able to orientate collectively what we were doing under the maxim of the primary task over the years, i.e. the significance it had for the possible learning of the
participants, the more we were able to increase our own learning about what it means to manage an institution and what management and institutions really may be about in comparison to the various surrogates we are often involved in or opposed to on other occasions.

What our individual as well as collective learning is about is obviously quite different from the managerial strategies which are increasingly propagated in a search of excellence (cf. Peters and Waterman (1982)) and its inherent tendencies towards a subtle engineering of organizational cultures of dependency. These approaches seem nearly exclusively devoted to pursuing happiness and profit. In so far as they not only intend to provide an income for their employees living but also the necessary meaning for its optimization (Peters and Waterman (1982), 239) these organizations and enterprises tend to become surrogates for the churches. As such they are based upon the assumption that there is evidently no evidence and, therefore, no further understanding beyond what obviously is obvious: the companies' and its members' welfare. The daily experience that the unconscious appears to be unknown functions as a proof for its nonexistence. Through cultural engineering the cultural inheritance of mankind tends to be reduced to the image of the hero (cf. Garfield (1986)) for whom the American cowboy has become the predominant protagonist; that heroes previously were supposed to fight with dragons (cf. Sievers (1988)) and that they were not immortal unless they had died thus falls into total oblivion. If one ever holds on to notions of inheritance and succession they are limited to the predominantly smooth stories and sagas about the founder of the enterprise be it a Walt Disney, William R. Hewlett and David Packard or the Mars brothers.

In our attempt to go beyond these and others similarly narrow frames we time and again make the frequently painful experience that the majority of our contemporaries, managers and colleagues both in consultancy as well as in the scientific community tend to reject the often quite existential questioning of the mainstream assumptions about the relatedness of men, their institutions, and the meaning they give to their lives vis-à-vis the surrounding world. To cope with this ignorance and its frequently related feelings of contempt and aggression in such a way as to assume that one is surrounded by pagans, often appears the easiest way. But on occasions, if such an easy defense no longer tranquilizes one's own doubts, frustrations, and feelings of incompetence at not being able to communicate what one is really up to, one is caught in deep despair; one then often has no other choice than to admit that one remains in darkness and that one is alone (cf. Broadbent (1979); Novak (1970)). On these occasions one cannot even remember that the 'extended family'
is sleeping on the other side of the river; instead of wrestling with an opponent whom one cannot trace one may even curse oneself that one has ever felt entitled to grasp the fatherly phallus and to long for his blessing. To the extent that one is caught in the monologues and the self-accusations of one’s despair, one can neither hold on to one’s previous experience of one’s own authority nor can one find any authorship to express oneself in relation to others. These are occasions in which one not only finds oneself being separated from what one used to be on previous occasions but also totally dissociated from the universe. In a state like that one may even envy the ancient Jacob who in his mourning and despair about the apparent death of his beloved son and successor was at least able to wrangle with God.

On other occasions, however, when we can get a hold of our own "capacity for tolerating frustration" and thus initiate "the mating of conceptions and realizations" we may be able to develop and to maintain for ourselves as well as for others "procedures necessary to learning by experience" (Bion (1962), 307 f.). Experiencing this capacity in ourselves may then provide the necessary containment for others, too, to tolerate their frustrations and discover this capacity for themselves instead of denying their own frustrations by projecting them into others (cf. Sievers (1986), 1987b)). Acknowledging such a 'capacity for tolerating frustration' for oneself and being able to work with it, is not only a matter of authority; it is also based upon one's capacity to grow and to move on towards the depressive position. The capability "of achieving a measure of integration" "also means losing some of the idealization" (Klein (1963), 111, 105) both of the fatherly object of the testator and of a part of the self as the successor.

The more we become able to achieve such a measure of integration for ourselves, the more we will be able to substitute our own desperate longing for a blessing by a capacity for authority. This may enable us further to locate our own individual lines of succession and their respective transferences into the broader context of cultural inheritance. As Winnicott ((1966), 370) has stated, culture is the "inherited tradition" which is part of "the common pool of humanity and into which individuals and groups of people may contribute, and a source from which we may all draw if we have somewhere to put what we find". The fact "that in any cultural field it is not possible to be original except on a basis of tradition" (ibid.) thus may encourage us to relate to the six thousand years of our history of myths and metaphors and to become fathers and mothers of invention and revelation ourselves.
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